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HUMAN NEUROSCIENCE
A detailed implementation was provided by Holroyd and Coles 
(2002), who considered ACC from the point of view of tem-
poral difference (TD) learning, an algorithm belonging to the 
reinforcement learning (RL) field (Sutton and Barto, 1998). RL 
is a framework from machine learning, and provides a formal 
explanation for classical results from learning theory. Holroyd and 
Coles (2002) argued that the basal ganglia estimate values using 
TD learning, and send a prediction error signal to ACC for the 
latter to act as a “control filter” and choose an appropriate motor 
controller for the task at hand. Another view is that ACC estimates 
the probability that an error occurs for specific events (error-
likelihood theory). Brown and Braver (2005) proposed that when 
stimuli or actions are associated with errors, a Hebbian learning 
process connects the neurons encoding the stimuli to the ACC. 
Hence, if a stimulus or action is often (i.e., with high likelihood) 
accompanied by an error, it will activate ACC. Another influential 
view is that ACC computes response conflict (Botvinick et al., 
2001). Often, a stimulus affords two or more actions, in which 
case two or more responses will be activated simultaneously. This 
co-activation is translated into a high energy level, or response 
conflict, which is computed by ACC. For example, a pizza sign 
on the left and a dim sum sign on the right might activate both 
left- and right-going tendencies in the hungry traveler. Finally, 
a recent perspective holds that ACC computes volatility, or the 
extent to which the probabilities linking situations and outcomes 
in the environment are variable across time (Behrens et al., 2007). 
For example, repeatedly playing tennis against the same opponent, 
who has a variable tennis skill level from day to day, makes our 
probability of winning the match variable from day to day, leading 
to volatile outcomes of the match.
IntroductIon
What do I want to eat, Chinese or Italian? If Italian, how to reach a 
good restaurant in a fast and comfortable manner? This question, 
which might befall a hungry visitor in a foreign city, illustrates a 
more general point: that in order to act adaptively, we must esti-
mate the values of both environmental stimuli (e.g., a picture of 
pizza on a sign) and our own actions (e.g., turning right or left 
before a bifurcation). These value estimates can then be used in 
later decision making.
One cortical area that has been implicated in value estimation is 
the medial frontal cortex (MFC), and in particular anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC). Evidence for value estimation in MFC has been 
obtained from many different levels and methodologies (Rushworth 
and Behrens, 2008). Single-unit recordings conducted in the ros-
tral ACC of macaque monkeys revealed neurons responding as a 
function of the expected reward magnitude of a cue (Matsumoto 
et al., 2003; Amiez et al., 2006). Other populations respond when 
the estimated or expected reward does not correspond to its actual 
occurrence, encoding the so-called reward prediction errors. These 
neurons fire either when a reward is delivered but not expected by 
the subject (positive prediction errors), or when a reward is not 
delivered but expected by the subject (negative prediction errors; 
Amiez et al., 2006; Matsumoto et al., 2007). Intuitively, positive 
prediction errors correspond to “good surprises,” and negative 
prediction errors to “bad surprises.” Also EEG and fMRI studies 
have shown a role for MFC in coding for reward prediction error 
(Oliveira et al., 2007; Jessup et al., 2010).
However, functions other than value estimation have also 
been ascribed to ACC. One influential point of view is that ACC 
is involved with error processing (e.g., Critchley et al., 2005). 
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Hence, on the one hand single-unit data in monkeys, point 
toward ACC involvement in value estimation and prediction error 
computation. On the other hand (human) EEG and fMRI data 
have inspired partially related or altogether different proposals. 
For example, the conflict monitoring perspective is able to account 
for the effects arising from many experimental paradigms, but it is 
unable to predict error-likelihood effects (Brown and Braver, 2005). 
At the same time, error-likelihood theory is able to explain some 
aspects of conflict effects in correct trials, but it cannot explain 
the ACC activity following an error in the very same paradigm 
(Brown and Braver, 2005). Moreover both conflict monitoring and 
error-likelihood models seem unsuited to explain the effects of 
volatility on ACC (Behrens et al., 2007). Finally it is worth noticing 
that there is yet no single-unit neurophysiological evidence sup-
porting error likelihood, conflict monitoring, or volatility theory 
(Cole et al., 2009).
The question remains, then, whether a unified view of ACC can 
be developed. Some steps toward reconciliation were already taken 
by Botvinick (2007), who proposed that response conflict can be 
considered as a cost for the cognitive system, which could be one 
aspect of the overall value of a stimulus. Unfortunately, a formal 
integration of the different levels and data is lacking. Before address-
ing this issue, however, we must first clarify two points. First, there is 
a rostro-caudal gradient in ACC with the caudal part (located ven-
trally to the supplementary motor area) exhibiting mainly motor 
and premotor functions (Dum and Strick, 2002), and the rostral 
part involved mainly with evaluative functions (Matsumoto et al., 
2003, 2007; Amiez et al., 2006; Rushworth and Behrens, 2008). All 
models mentioned above (except (Holroyd and Coles, 2002) were 
concerned with the evaluative aspect of ACC, and so is this paper. 
Stated in the framework of RL, the rostral part can be considered 
as a Critic, that is, a system deputized to evaluate stimuli and pos-
sible actions in terms of expected reward. As such it can provide a 
map of the most convenient environmental states and of the most 
convenient possible actions to perform. In contrast, the more caudal 
part can be considered as an Actor, which is a system that selects 
actions based on the evaluations provided by the Critic. Second, 
although the ACC prefers evaluating actions rather than stimuli 
(Rushworth and Behrens, 2008), it has been shown in monkeys that 
ACC can also code stimulus values (Amiez et al., 2006). For that 
reason, we here consider ACC to code the value of general “cues,” 
being either stimuli or actions.
Here we develop a unified view of the rostral part of ACC from 
the perspective of value estimation, embedded in the framework 
of RL. The core of the model is that, to estimate values online (i.e., 
while interacting with the environment), agents must formulate 
predictions about future rewards based on incoming events (i.e., 
reward prediction, here called V). These predictions must then be 
compared with the rewards actually obtained (prediction errors, 
here called δ), and estimates of V must be updated using δ. Based 
on this key idea and on single-unit recording data, we constructed 
the reward value and prediction model (RVPM). In the remainder, 
we first describe the model in more detail. Then, we show that the 
model is consistent with available single-unit data (Simulation 1). 
After that, we report the model’s application to error processing, 
in particular, different experimental modulations of EEG error-
related negativity (ERN) waves (Simulation 2). Next, we simulate 
data obtained in the framework of three influential theories of 
ACC, namely conflict monitoring (Simulation 3), error likelihood 
(Simulation 4), and volatility theory (Simulation 5). Finally, we 
discuss relations to earlier work and possible extensions.
General methods
Here, we first describe in mathematical notation the general con-
cepts of expected value and prediction error we already introduced 
above. Second, we show how the RVPM implements a mechanism 
to compute expected value online, by means of prediction errors. 
We describe the point of contact of RVPM with the relevant neuro-
physiology, and the equations determining RVPM dynamics. Third, 
we describe the general features of the simulations we ran to test 
the model behavior in several experimental paradigms.
Formal representatIon oF reward value and predIctIon error
The notation V
t
(a) is used to denote the value (expected reward) 
for some cue (stimulus or action) a, present at time t. It can be 
updated online using prediction error as follows:
V a V a R V at t t t( ) ( ) ( )= + −( )− −1 1α  (1)
where R
t







(a)) indicates the difference between the value that 
the system was expecting (V
t−1
(a)) and the actual environmental 
outcome (R
t
), where α is a learning rate parameter. Because firing 
rate is always a positive value, neurons can only encode positive 
values (or only negative values) via their firing rate. This causes 
a problem when coding this prediction error, as it can take both 
positive and negative values. The easiest way to solve this problem 
is through opponency coding (Daw et al., 2002), and consists in 
the current case of distinguishing two prediction errors. Positive 
prediction errors are denoted by:
δt t tR V a+ −= −( )max , ( )0 1  (2)
coherently with the definition of positive prediction error, Eq. 2 
corresponds to cases where the actual outcomes are better than 
expected. On the other hand, negative prediction errors code for 
situations where environmental outcomes are worse than expected. 
They are denoted by:
δt t tV a R− −= −( )max , ( )0 1  (3)
Both δ+ and δ− are non-negative, and Eq. 1 can be rewritten as:
V a V at t t t( ) ( ) .= + −( )− + −1 α δ δ  (4)
Equation 4 describes the process of online value updating in 
terms of prediction errors.
model archItecture and dynamIcs
As we anticipated in the Introduction, single-unit recordings con-
ducted in the ACC of macaque monkeys confirm the presence of 
the three neural populations coding for expected reward magnitude 
(V) (Matsumoto et al., 2003; Amiez et al., 2006), positive  prediction 
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error. However, for theoretical parsimony we decided to include in 
our model only those units that are necessary for a neural imple-
mentation of RL. Future work should investigate the functionality 
of these other classes of neurons.
sImulatIons
In all simulations, the network was exposed to temporal sequences 
in which each cue (C unit activity) was followed by a reward (RW 
unit activity) with some probability and after a delay. In the EEG 
and fMRI simulations, this delay was a proxy for the response time 
(RT), as modeling the motor response is beyond the scope of the 
current paper. Accordingly, the RVPM lacks an explicit encoding 
of behavioral errors, but it can detect the presence or absence of 
rewards via the RW signal. We propose that ACC activity is typically 
influenced by errors because errors often lead to missed reward. 
More generally, any event preventing an expected reward would 
be able to evoke the ACC response. This has been experimentally 
proven in monkeys, where negative prediction error units responded 
also at the signal indicating the end of the experimental block (and 
thus, the end of the possibility of receiving rewards; Amiez et al., 
2005). Further, both errors that are auto-detected by the subject 
(internal feedback) or informed by external feedback, activate the 
same region in ACC (Holroyd et al., 2004). Symmetrically, correct 
trials evoke the reward signal and thus activate the ACC.
The learning rate parameter α (Eq. f1.1) for updating the 
cue-value weights was set to make the activation of the V unit 
in response to C1 and C2 asymptotically stable within the pres-
entation of 60 trials (30 for each cue). Its value was α = 0.005. 
The parameter γ (Eqs f1.2–5) is a time constant that controls how 
quickly the neural units (modeled as dynamical systems) respond 
to external inputs; its value was γ = 0.1. The parameter ζ (Eqs 
f1.2–5) regulates the ratio between the power (amplitude) of V 
relative to δ units; its value was ζ = 2. The setting for this parameter 
leads to a greater power of δ than V responses, simulating, at the 
neurophysiological level, a greater number of δ units than V units, 
in accordance with population statistics found in macaque ACC 
(Quilodran et al., 2008). The time resolution of the system was 
10 ms, meaning that we arbitrarily assigned the value of 10 ms to 
each cycle of the program updating the network state. Although Eq 
f1.2–f1.4 are deterministic, at each cycle a small amount of noise 
(white noise with SD = 0.5) was added to their dynamics, which 
made the learning process smoother and less dependent on local 
fluctuations of reward rates. Parameters were set to simulate the 
neurophysiological data (Simulation 1); we did not change them 
for any of the later (EEG and fMRI) simulations. The model was 
robust in the sense that changing the parameter settings led to 
qualitatively similar results.
sImulatIon 1: acc neurophysIoloGy
We first demonstrate that the model is indeed consistent with the 
neurophysiology of the ACC.
methods
We presented to the model 72 trials resembling a Pavlovian con-
ditioning setup. In each trial one of the two cue units (C1 or C2) 
was activated with 50% probability, generating a square wave of 
unit amplitude and duration equal to 2000 ms. 1600-ms after cue 
error (δ+) (Matsumoto et al., 2007), and negative prediction error 
(δ−) (Amiez et al., 2005; Matsumoto et al., 2007). Figure 1A shows 
the architecture of the RVPM, which implements these three cell 
types in the ACC module. This ACC module receives afferents 
from units coding for external cues (C1 and C2) and from a unit 
(RW) generating the reward signal (RW). A plausible neural struc-
ture to generate this reward signal is the ventral tegmental area 
(VTA). Indeed, a subset of dopaminergic neurons in VTA code 
consistently for reward occurrence rather than exhibiting the well-
known TD signature (Ljungberg et al., 1992; Schultz, 1998). The 
RW unit explicitly models this latter class of cells. The cue units 
code whatever event occurs external to the RVPM, be it a stimulus 
or a planned action.
The aim of such a device is to act as a Critic, that is, to map 
the values of the cues represented by the C units. To achieve this 
goal, the weights vector w (which represents the map of cue val-
ues) between the C units and the V unit is updated with Hebbian 
learning modulated by the activity of the prediction error units 
(δ+, δ−). The exact learning rule for the weights vector is shown 
in Eq. f1.1, which is an instantiation of the general description of 
value updating provided in Eq. 4. The convergence of the learning 
algorithm is analytically proven in the Section “Appendix.” Here 
we just note that the learning process converges asymptotically to 
generate V signals that are unbiased approximations of the reward 
value linked to each cue. Convergence does not depend on specific 
values of the learning rate parameter, which basically is a discount 
factor: the greater it is, the stronger is the contribution of recent 
trials with respect to past trials.
The dynamics for δunits is described in Eq f1.3 and f1.4, which 
are instantiations of the general descriptions provided by Eqs 2 and 
3. The differential equations describing the V and δ units’ dynamics 
(f1.2, f1.3, f1.4, Figure 1A) express exponential processes in which 
γ represents the time constant. They converge to values equal to 
the input of the neural unit. The ACC module also receives a bell-
shaped timing signal peaking on the average delay value (Ivry, 1996; 
Mauk and Buonomano, 2004; O’Reilly et al., 2007; Bueti et al., 
2010). See Section “Appendix” for details on the timing signal. Of 
course, this timing signal has to be learned as well (e.g., by spectral 
timing; Brown et al., 1999) but this aspect is beyond the scope of 
the current paper.
Finally, the output of the ACC module was combined to simulate 
the activity of dopaminergic neurons in VTA that exhibit a TD-like 
signature (here called temporally shifting neurons, TSN; Eq. f1.5, 
Figure 1A). Experimental findings showed that these neurons are 
at first phasically activated by primary rewards; then, after train-
ing, they shift their activation toward reward-predictive stimuli 
and show a depression of their baseline activity if the reward is 
not given (Schultz, 1998). Although this unit has no functional 
role in the current model, we addressed these data also, as a test 
on the broadness of our approach, and because it could provide 
interesting theoretical insight about the role of the ACC in higher-
order learning.
The ACC contains other types of neural populations besides 
the ones we modeled. For example, Quilodran et al. (2008) found 
neural units whose activity resembled the temporal shifting of 
dopaminergic responses found in the VTA. Matsumoto et al. (2007) 
found neural units encoding for the absolute value of the prediction 
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the biological neurons found in monkey ACC (Amiez et al., 2006), 
is able to encode cue values combining both reward probabilities 
and reward magnitudes (Appendix).
In the second and the third row of Figure 1B we plotted the 
responses of δ+ and δ− units, respectively. For δ+, reward trials are 
plotted; for δ−, missed reward trials. After training, these units 
showed activity levels coding the discrepancy between the expec-
tations (V) and the outcomes (RW signal; Matsumoto et al., 2007).
Finally, in Figure 1C, we simulated the TSN population found in 
VTA. Like its biological counterpart (Schultz et al., 1997; Stuber et al., 
2008), the TSN activation did not gradually move in time from reward 
to cue presentation. Instead, it presented at first a phasic response to 
primary reward release; during training, it started to respond to both 
cues and rewards, and finally it responded mainly to reward-predictive 
cues. At the same time, during unrewarded trials, the TSN showed a dip 
of its baseline activity at the time when reward would have occurred. 
For clarity, only Late trials are plotted in the right part of Figure 1C; 
a full plot is provided in Figure A3 in Appendix. We obtained such 
response dynamics because TSN activity was determined by the con-
vergence of the signals from the δ units (which were reward-locked and 
decreased when trial number increased) and the signal from the V unit 
(which was cue-locked and increased with increasing trial number).
onset, the RW unit generated a reward signal (RW) with probability 
0.87 for C1 and 0.33 for C2. RW consisted of a square wave with 
amplitude equal to 4 and duration equal to 400 ms (black line in 
Figure 1B). Initially the weights vector w was randomly set with 
small values (close to 0.01). We repeated the simulation 20 times 
(runs). The results we present are the grand average of the first 
five trials (i.e., early in training) and the last five trials (i.e., late in 
training) of all the 20 runs.
results and dIscussIon
The first row of Figure 1B shows the V unit response on rewarded 
trials for the two cues (C1, 0.87 reward probability, left column; 
and C2, 0.33 reward probability, right column). Early and late unit 
responses are plotted separately. Late in training, the activity of the 
V unit (first row) codes the reward value linked to each cue. More 
exactly, the ratio between the asymptotic V values in response to 
each cue is an unbiased approximation of the ratio between their 
respective reward rates (see Appendix). In the current simulations, 
we manipulated the value of the cues by changing their reward 
probabilities. Cue values can alternatively be manipulated by assign-
ing to each cue different reward magnitudes, or by manipulating 
both reward probabilities and reward magnitudes. Our V unit, like 
Figure 1 | (A) Model structure with equations describing both model 
dynamics and learning process (see also Methods of Simulation 1 and 
Appendix). Model structure: V, reward prediction unit; δ+ and δ−, positive and 
negative prediction error units; C1 and C2, units coding for events; TSN, 
temporally shifting neuron; RW, unit generating reward signal. Model 
dynamics and learning: α, γ, and ζ are parameters. Equation f1.1 describes 
weights dynamics, 

w , weights vector; 

C , cue units’ output vector; V, 
prediction unit output; δ+, δ−, output of prediction error units (positive and 
negative). Equations f1.2–f1.5 describe model dynamics: the symbol x ’ 
indicates first derivative, while [x]+ indicates the rectification max(0, x); RW, 
reward signal; TSN, temporally shifting neuron output. (B) Simulation 1: ACC 
neurophysiology. Model behavior during Pavlovian conditioning of two 
different stimuli, one rewarded 87% (left column) and the other 33% (right 
column). All plots are stimulus onset-locked, time scale in ms, signal 
amplitudes are in arbitrary units. Red plots: activity during the first trials of 
training; blue plots: activity recorded after several tens of trials (see Methods). 
After some tens of trials (blue plots), the response of the V unit (first row) to 
stimuli became proportional to the reward rate. Prediction error units (second 
and third row) showed, during reward periods (indicated by black bars on the 
top), responses proportional to the discrepancy between the expectation (V 
unit activity) and the actual outcome (RW signal). (C) Left: behavior of the TSN 
unit during three different training periods (early, middle, and late training). It 
exhibits temporal shifting of its response from the reward period to the cue 
period. Right: activity of the TSN unit during unrewarded trials, exhibiting a 
depression of its baseline activity (arrow) at the time when reward 
is expected.
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sImulatIon 3: conFlIct monItorInG
Another influential perspective on ACC functioning is that it 
reflects the amount of response conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001; Van 
Veen et al., 2001). In particular, stimuli affording two or more dif-
ferent responses (incongruent stimuli) typically lead to higher ACC 
activation than stimuli that afford only one (congruent stimuli; 
Van Veen et al., 2001; Van Veen and Carter, 2005). For example, 
in a Stroop task, stimuli with color words in a different ink color 
than the word meaning (e.g., RED in green ink) are incongruent, 
while stimuli in which there is no conflict between color and word 
are congruent (e.g., RED in red ink). Botvinick et al. (2001) have 
proposed that ACC measures the simultaneous activation of dif-
ferent response alternatives (quantified as response conflict). As a 
consequence, ACC would respond more strongly to incongruent 
than to congruent stimuli. Instead, the current model proposes 
that ACC generally responds when cues (stimuli, actions) lead to 
an outcome that is different (e.g., worse) than expected. In this 
way, the estimated value of such cues can be updated using the 
prediction error. According to the RVPM, a reward following an 
incongruent stimulus is unexpected for two reasons. First, accuracy 
is typically lower for incongruent stimuli, so a correct response 
is less expected (and the effect is typically calculated on correct 
responses only). The second reason derives from the fact that RVPM 
estimates that the reward or feedback will arrive around the aver-
age RT (implemented by a timing signal, see Appendix). When 
this average RT is reached and a response not yet given, the δ− unit 
signals an unexpected event. In addition, this δ− activity decreases 
the value (V unit) of incongruent trials in the long run, leading to 
increased δ+ activity when an incongruent trial is correctly solved. 
Hence, because accuracies are lower and RTs slower in incongruent 
trials, they lead to more ACC activation. A detailed exposition of 
this argument is provided in Figure A1 (Appendix).
methods
First, we mimic the RT and accuracy rates of the fMRI study 
of Van Veen and Carter (2005). The general sequence of events 
occurring within each trial was as in Simulations 1 and 2, except 
sImulatIon 2: errors and error-related neGatIvIty
The ERN is an EEG wave measured at midfrontal electrodes which 
is typically larger for error than for correct trials (Falkenstein et al., 
1991; Gehring et al., 1993). For correct trials, it is referred to as CRN; 
CRN and ERN originate from the same neural generator (Roger 
et al., 2010). Because the ERN is located by dipole modeling in 
the ACC (Falkenstein et al., 1991; Gehring et al., 1993; Posner and 
Dehaene, 1994), one influential perspective on ACC holds that its 
function is error monitoring. Here, we evaluate the predictions of 
the RVPM on ACC involvement in error processing.
methods
As noted before, an error is coded in our model as a “missed reward” 
feedback signal from outside ACC. Such a signal can arrive either 
from other parts of cortex (internal error feedback) or from an 
explicit error signal (external error feedback). In the latter case, 
it is called feedback-related negativity (FRN). It follows from the 
model formulation that these should be processed similarly; and 
indeed, FRN and ERN exhibit the same type of modulation by 
event frequencies (Oliveira et al., 2007; Nunez Castellar et al., 2010).
All design specifications (trial structure, duration, number of 
trials, etc) were as in Simulation 1. The plots represent the grand 
average of the whole ACC module activity (sum of the three units) 
during the reward periods.
results and dIscussIon
When most trials are correct, the model indeed predicts a larger ACC 
response to error than to correct trials (Figure 2 left plot). This is 
because errors are less frequent, and hence, when an error occurs, 
there is a strong response of the δ− unit detecting a discrepancy 
between expectation (correct) and outcome (error). In general, this 
finding accounts for the fact that the size of the ERN depends on the 
probability of accuracy (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Nunez Castellar 
et al., 2010). The ERN even reverses when errors are more expected 
than correct trials (Oliveira et al., 2007). Also this phenomenon is 
captured by the RVPM: when errors become more frequent than 
correct trials, the model predicts a reverse ERN (Figure 2 right plot).
Figure 2 | Simulation 2: error processing. Model global activity (sum of 
all the three units of the model) during the reward period. All the plots are 
feedback onset-locked, time scale in milliseconds. As noted in the text, 
feedback can be either internally generated (ERN, feedback onset close 
to response) or external (FRN). The two plots show the crossover of 
response amplitude for correct or incorrect trials as a function of the 
reward expectation (87 or 33%), resembling the ERN wave behavior 
in humans.
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results and dIscussIon
For the first simulation (Van Veen and Carter, 2005), the model repro-
duced the fMRI results, showing a higher activation for incongruent 
than congruent correct trials [t(19) = 2.74, p = 0.013; Figure 3A, 
left plot]. Results on error trials were not reported in (Van Veen and 
Carter, 2005) but for completeness we here report that the model pre-
dicts a higher ACC activation for congruent error trials than incon-
gruent error trials [t(19) = 7.14, p < 0.0001; Figure 3A, right plot].
For the second simulation, in line with empirical observations 
(Scheffers and Coles, 2000), the model did not predict a “conflict-
like ERN effect” for correct trials [t(19) = −1.05, p = 0.30; Figure 
3B, left plot]. Finally, concerning the error trials, the model was able 
to reproduce a reverse conflict effect with larger ERN for congruent 
than for incongruent trials [t(19) = 8.22, p < 0.0001; Figure 3B, right 
plot], again in line with empirical data (Scheffers and Coles, 2000).
According to the model, incongruent stimuli lead to more 
ACC activation than congruent stimuli (on correct trials) because 
they tend to lead to higher error rates and also to longer RTs. We 
already discussed (Simulation 2) that ERN is sensitive to error 
probability. It also follows that the model predicts ERN to be sen-
sitive to late responding, and this is indeed empirically observed 
(Luu et al., 2000).
that two different feedback onset (i.e., RT) distributions were 
introduced for incongruent and congruent trials: the mean RT 
was 720 ms for incongruent and 600 ms for congruent trials 
(SD = 100 ms). The mean accuracy rate was 92% for congru-
ent and 85% for incongruent trials. As before, we repeated the 
simulation 20 times (runs). The results reported in the plots 
(Figure 3) are the grand average of the whole ACC module 
(sum of the three units) during the feedback periods in the 
last 15 congruent and the last 15 incongruent trials. Statistics 
were performed as follows. We computed the mean signal power 
from the whole ACC during the feedback periods of the last 
15 congruent and the last 15 incongruent trials, for each run 
separately (20 runs, mean over congruent versus incongruent 
trials separately). Treating the 20 runs as “subjects” in a repeated-
measures design, we performed paired t-tests comparing ACC 
signal power in incongruent versus congruent trials for both 
correct and error trials.
For the second simulation, we based RT distributions and accu-
racy rates on those reported in the EEG study of Scheffers and Coles 
(2000). Congruent trials had a mean accuracy of 90% and a mean 
RT equal to 500 ms (SD = 100 ms). For incongruent trials, these 
values were 86% and 540 ms (SD = 100 ms).
Figure 3 | Simulation 3: conflict monitoring. Response amplitude for 
congruent (CO) and incongruent trials (IN) in two experimental paradigms. 
All the plots are feedback onset-locked, time scale in ms. (A) Simulation with 
RTs and error rates as in the fMRI study of Van Veen and Carter (2005). The 
ACC module of the RVPM showed a higher activation for incongruent than 
congruent correct trials (incongruent > congruent, left plot), but a crossover 
of response (congruent > incongruent) for error trials (right plot). (B) 
Simulation with RTs and error rates resembling the ERP study of Scheffers 
and Coles (2000). Coherently with the ERP findings, the model did not show 
a difference between the congruent and incongruent condition in correct 
trials (left), but it showed a higher activity for congruent than incongruent 
error trials.
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and a main effect of Change versus Go [Change versus Go trials, 
F(1,77) = 15.86, p < 0.001]. Post hoc analysis showed (again in agree-
ment with Brown and Braver’s results) an error-likelihood effect 
also in Go trials [HGo versus LGo, t(19) = 2.39, p < 0.05]. This 
response pattern was evident during the feedback period (i.e., when 
the system processed the outcomes), and was due to the δ+ unit 
activity, which responded to the discrepancy between the expecta-
tion (which was low for the high-error-likelihood conditions) and 
the outcome (achieved reward).
The RVPM showed, in line with the fMRI results, but differ-
ently from the Error-Likelihood model prediction, a reverse effect 
for error trials on high-versus-low error probability trials [Figure 
4, right plot; LCh versus HCh, t(19) = 6.71, p < 0.0001]. Also in 
this case, the effect was evident during the feedback period, and 
it was due to the strong response of the δ− unit, which detected 
the discrepancy between the high level of expectation evoked by 
low-error-likelihood cues and the absence of positive feedback. In 
the high-error-likelihood condition, negative feedback was more 
expected, leading to relatively less δ− activity. In contrast, the error-
likelihood model does not predict this reversal because it responds 
to the likelihood of errors, which does not depend on the subject’s 
performance on the current trial.
The RVPM predicts higher activation for low-error-likelihood 
conditions during the cue period (see Figure A2 in Appendix). The 
reason is that low-error-likelihood trials predict higher reward values 
(encoded by the V unit) while the δ units are not discharging yet during 
cue presentation. More generally, the RVPM predicts that ACC activity 
should vary as a function of the predicted accuracy (value) during cue 
periods. This has been validated both at the single-cell level (Amiez 
et al., 2006) and in fMRI studies on humans (Knutson et al., 2005; 
Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Peters and Buchel, 2010), although one 
fMRI study did not find any area coding for reward or error prediction 
(Nieuwenhuis et al., 2007). In two of the fMRI studies that evidenced 
the presence of reward prediction coding in ACC (Kable and Glimcher, 
2007; Peters and Buchel, 2010) the local maxima corresponding to the 
ACC activation were more rostral than the one in Brown and Braver’s 
(2005) study. These activation peaks belonged to what has tradition-
ally been defined as the affective division of ACC (Bush et al., 2000), 
typically involved in tasks recruiting emotional processing. Although 
the division between cognitive and affective zones of ACC has recently 
been questioned (e.g., Egner et al., 2008; Shackman et al., 2011), more 
generally different aspects of value are probably coded in different 
subregions of ACC to be used in task-specific decision making.
sImulatIon 5: volatIlIty
Recently, ACC was proposed to be involved in volatility estima-
tion (Behrens et al., 2007). Behrens et al. (2007) argued from an 
optimality perspective that the learning rates of a cognitive system 
should vary depending on the volatility of its environment. They 
proposed that ACC registers this volatility and uses it to update 
learning rates. In an fMRI experiment, they demonstrated that 
volatility estimates correlate with ACC activation.
methods
We simulated the Behrens et al. (2007) experimental task and design. 
We presented sequentially to the network two different environ-
ments: a stationary environment, in which two cues were rewarded 
A crucial difference, according to the model, between Van Veen 
et al.’s and Scheffers and Coles’ experiment is that in the latter the RT 
difference between incongruent and congruent stimuli was too subtle. 
As explained above (and in more detail in Figure A1 in Appendix), if 
the RT distributions overlap too strongly for congruent and incon-
gruent stimuli, the delta units exhibit less differential activity and the 
predicted difference also decreases. A literature search reveals that 
Scheffers and Coles’ (2002) RT difference is indeed smaller than in 
other studies (Botvinick et al., 1999; Van Veen et al., 2001; Milham 
et al., 2002; Kerns et al., 2004; Van Veen and Carter, 2005). The only 
exception we could find was Kerns (2006) who had a smaller RT 
difference than Scheffers and Coles but did observe ACC activation. 
However, this author did not report the error rates, which (in case 
of higher error rates for incongruent trials) could have had a crucial 
role in driving the ACC activation. Finally, a recent fMRI study (Carp 
et al., 2010) reports that the incongruency effect in MFC disappears 
when controlling for RTs between incongruent versus congruent trials.
sImulatIon 4: error lIkelIhood
The ACC has also been proposed to estimate the likelihood of com-
mitting an error (Brown and Braver, 2005). In their Change Signal 
experiment, Brown and Braver (2005) presented arrows pointing in 
one of two directions, which could either switch direction (Change 
trial) or not (Go trial) during the trial some time after trial onset. The 
color of the arrow indicated the time at which the arrow could switch 
(color 1, late switch, high error probability; color 2, early switch, low 
error probability). It was found that ACC responded more strongly 
to correct high-error-likelihood trials than to correct low-error-
likelihood trials. This was the case for both no-switch (i.e., Go) and 
switch (Change) trials. In addition, there was a main effect of Change 
versus Go trials. This was consistent with Brown and Braver’s error-
likelihood model. In contrast, on error trials, there was a stronger ACC 
response to low-error-likelihood than to high-error-likelihood trials.
methods
Like in Simulation 3, we simulated the different experimental con-
ditions (change/go and high/low error probability) by manipu-
lating both feedback onsets (mimicking RT distributions) and 
accuracy rates. The mean feedback onsets were the following: high 
error-likelihood change (HCh) = 750 ms, high error-likelihood 
go (HGo) = 650 ms, low error-likelihood change (LCh) = 730 ms, 
low error-likelihood go (LGo) = 600 ms, all of them normally dis-
tributed with SD = 100 ms. Accuracy rates were the following: 
HCh = 50%, HGo = 70%, LCh = 96%, LGo = 98%. Sixty-seven 
percentage of cues indicated Go trials (LGo + HGo). All these val-
ues were set to reproduce as closely as possible the behavioral data 
described by Brown and Braver (2005). The exact RTs are not critical 
in the current simulation, as model responses are driven mainly by 
the accuracy differences across conditions. Data plotting and statis-
tical analysis were executed on the last five trials of each condition, 
and followed the same procedure of Simulation 3.
results and dIscussIon
The left plot of Figure 4 shows that the RVPM was able to replicate 
the fMRI results of Brown and Braver’s (2005) study, predicting in 
correct trials a main effect of error likelihood [high-error-likelihood 
versus low-error-likelihood trials, F(1,77) = 38.37, p < 0.0001], 
Silvetti et al. ACC, value, and prediction error
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results and dIscussIon
Figure 5A shows, in agreement with fMRI data (Behrens et al., 
2007) that, during the reward periods, the model exhibited a 
higher activation in the volatile epoch for both rewarded [left plot, 
t(19) = 9.15, p < 0.0001] and unrewarded [right plot, one-tailed 
t(19) = 1.89, p < 0.05] trials. This result was due to the higher 
average activation of δ units during the volatile epoch, because 
of the necessity of a continuous re-mapping between cues and 
expectations (cf. variation rate plotted in Figure 5B). Hence, what 
drove the model’s overall activity during the outcome period was 
the amount of prediction error signal.
The RVPM does not implement the dynamic adjusting of the 
learning parameter characterizing Behrens et al.’s model. Indeed, 
although the variation rate of synaptic weights was higher dur-
ing the volatile condition (Figure 5B), the learning parameter α 
remained constant. This is because we did not provide the RVPM 
with the machinery to dynamically adjust learning rate as a func-
tion of the environment. We propose that such a process could 
emerge from the interaction between ACC and locus coeruleus 
(LC). The LC could receive information from ACC about environ-
mental uncertainty (e.g., through the average activity of delta units) 
and set the system’s learning rate by noradrenergic signals (Yu and 
Dayan, 2005; Verguts and Notebaert, 2009; Tully and Bolshakov, 
2010; Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2011). The implementation of this 
process is beyond the aims of this work, but it represents an interest-
ing challenge for future developments of the RVPM.
General dIscussIon
Here we integrated some ACC functions from the perspective of 
RL theory (Sutton and Barto, 1998). We proposed that systems-
level ACC data (from fMRI or EEG) are due to the activity of 
neural units estimating cue values, and neural units computing 
the errors between these predictions and the actual environmental 
outcomes. There is a growing interest in the literature for predic-
tion errors in EEG and fMRI studies of ACC (Jessup et al., 2010; 
with constant probabilities (75 and 25% respectively), and a volatile 
environment, in which the probability linking cues and rewards 
switched regularly between two possible values, 80 and 20%. All 
rewards were given 1600 ms after cue onset. In this simulation, we 
implemented a simplified Actor module in addition to the RVPM 
Critic. During each trial the model was required to choose one of 
the two cues according to their reward values (action selection), and 
then wait for the reward. We implemented a Softmax algorithm that 
on each trial made a choice between one of the two cues based on 
their value estimate (i.e., V unit activity) in the preceding trial. In 














) is the probability of selecting the ith cue, Temp = 4 is 
the temperature parameter, and V
i
 is the V response to the last pres-
entation of the ith cue. We set the temperature parameter in order 
to generate a small bias (55%) toward the cue evoking the higher 
expectation (Behrens et al., 2007). We performed 20 simulation runs. 
In each run, the first 72 trials were stationary (stationary epoch) and 
the second 72 were volatile (volatile epoch). In the volatile epoch, 
the reward rates were switched halfway (after 36 trials). Data plot-
ting and statistical analysis were performed with the procedure of 
Simulation 3. Like in Behrens et al. (2007) we excluded from plotting 
and analysis the first 20 trials of each epoch (stationary and volatile), 
considering them as transition trials in which the system was still 
learning the reward contingencies. We also calculated the extent of 
variation (variation rate) of the connection weights between the 
C units and the V unit. For each weight, we computed the mean 
absolute value of the difference between the weight at the end versus 
at the beginning of a trial. The mean of these differences (over the 
two connections) represented the variation rate as a function of 
trial number. Finally, the variation rate was smoothed by a Gaussian 
kernel having 10 trials as full-width half-maximum.
Figure 4 | Simulation 4: error-likelihood estimation. Plots are feedback 
onset-locked, time scale in ms. HCh, high-error-likelihood incongruent trials; LCh, 
low-error-likelihood incongruent trials; HGo, high-error-likelihood congruent trials; 
LGo, low-error-likelihood congruent trials. For correct trials, the model showed a 
higher activity for high-error-likelihood than for low-error-likelihood trials (both 
Change and Go trials; left plot), but a reverse effect for error trials (right plot).
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the actor–crItIc Framework
As noted before, a value computation device as described here is 
called a Critic in Actor–Critic models of RL (Sutton and Barto, 
1998). Presumably other structures also perform part of the Critic 
function (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex, OFC; Schoenbaum et al., 1998; 
Tremblay and Schultz, 1999; O’Doherty, 2007) and insular cortex 
(Craig, 2010). In general, the Critic can be considered to be multi-
dimensional with different reward and cost statistics computed by 
different structures. For example, whereas we have focused on value 
and prediction errors as estimates of mean reward (or accuracy) 
rates, it is conceivable that other statistics of the reward distribu-
tion besides mean reward are encoded also, such as reward vari-
ance or risk (Brown and Braver, 2007). In addition, the Critic may 
compute expected costs (Rudebeck et al., 2006; Kennerley et al., 
2009). Further, also changes in the reward distribution across time 
(e.g., volatility) could be encoded in different areas of cortex. As 
(Behrens et al., 2007) noted, this could be useful for adapting the 
learning rate to the current environmental settings. These aspects 
Nunez Castellar et al., 2010) and in behavioral cognitive control 
(Notebaert et al., 2009). The current paper provides a computa-
tional rationale for them and shows how they give rise to higher-
level effects. For example, the RVPM shows how ACC activation 
ascribed to conflict and error (likelihood) can arise from predic-
tion error computation. Error effects occur when error trials are 
less frequent than correct trials so that when an error occurs, a 
negative prediction error is detected. Similarly, incongruent trials 
are associated with longer RTs and/or with higher error rates than 
congruent trials; therefore, when positive feedback is received, 
the (positive) prediction error is higher for incongruent than for 
congruent trials. In general, the aim of the ACC is to create map-
pings between cues (e.g., external stimuli or actions) and values 
indicating their fitness for the organism (Rushworth and Behrens, 
2008). Consistent with this, ACC receives input from (high-level) 
motor areas, which code for actions, and also from the posterior 
parietal cortex (Devinsky et al., 1995), which can be considered 
as input coding for external stimuli.
Figure 5 | Simulation 5: volatility. Plots are reward onset-locked, time scale 
in ms (A) Model response during feedback periods in volatile and stationary 
environments. All the plots are feedback onset-locked, timescale in milliseconds. 
Stat, stationary condition; Vol, volatile condition. The model showed a higher 
activity in a volatile environment than in a stationary environment for both 
rewarded (left plot) and unrewarded (right plot) trials. (B) Variation rate of the 
weights (black plot) connecting the C units to the V unit, as a function of trial 
number. In the first epoch, the model was exposed to a Stationary environment 
(constant reward rates, red and blue lines indicating the reward rates of two 
different cues). During the second epoch, the environment became volatile 
(reward rate switching between red and blue), and the δ units started to re-map 
the associations between cues and reward rates, thus increasing the weights 
variation rates. The two hills in the volatile epoch correspond to the two reward 
rate switches.
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from ACC. Recurrent connections between ACC and VTA have 
indeed been documented both in monkeys and in rats (Devinsky 
et al., 1995; Geisler et al., 2007). The TSN of our model was not 
functional in the current simulations. However, one reason for 
modeling it was to advance a computational hypothesis on a 
well-known experimental result (Schultz et al., 1997; Stuber et al., 
2008). A second reason was to show that our model can provide 
a basis for TD learning, a class of algorithms from the field of 
RL (Montague et al., 1996). The core of this method consists of 
updating value estimates not only by comparing expectations 
and actual outcomes but also by comparing new expectations 
with past expectations. In other words, in order to adapt the 
mapping between stimuli and reward expectations, the agent 
does not have to wait until the actual reward. TD methods can 
be considered as a generalization of Rescorla-Wagner methods 
(Sutton and Barto, 1998), which our ACC model belongs to. 
As in TD learning, the TSN signal in the VTA of RVPM can be 
used as a proxy of the primary reward signal; in this way, stimuli 
which are only indirectly associated with reward, can still achieve 
high value estimates (i.e., higher-order conditioning) in ACC. 
As such, these can be used as a training signal for cortical and 
subcortical circuits, due to the wide efferents of the brainstem 
dopaminergic nuclei.
Future work
Because of its computational nature, our theory can produce 
explicit experimental predictions that could be easily tested. We here 
discuss just a few possible future experiments. The first one is to test 
the prediction of a crossover of ACC activity between cue period 
and feedback period in correct trials. This is because the lower is the 
reward expectation during the cue period, the higher is the positive 
prediction error during the feedback period for correct trials. At 
the same time, for incorrect trials, we expect that cue-related and 
feedback-related activity (negative prediction error) covary.
A further test concerns the RVPM prediction that high ACC 
responsiveness in volatile environments reflects intense predic-
tion error activity (uncertainty) rather than volatility coding. This 
prediction could be tested by comparing the ACC activation in a 
volatile environment relative to a stationary environment charac-
terized by high levels of uncertainty (with reward rates near 50%; 
stationary-uncertain). Instead, Behrens et al. (2007) compared a 
volatile environment relative to a stationary environment with 
high levels of certainty (stationary-certain). Given that RVPM 
responds to prediction errors, it predicts higher activation in 
volatile than in stationary-certain conditions (as already found 
by Behrens et al., 2007 and replicated in Simulation 5), but it also 
predicts more activation for stationary-uncertain than for volatile 
environments. We are currently working on a test of this prediction 
using fMRI. Finally, future work will be also conducted on higher-
order conditioning with the aim of integrating this view on ACC 
with higher-order learning via RL-type mechanisms. In this way, 
we hope to learn not only about Actor–Critic interactions, but 
also how this interaction is impaired in behavioral–pathological 
conditions in which ACC dysfunction has been reported such as 
ADHD (Groen et al., 2008; Herrmann et al., 2010), drug abuse 
(Goldstein et al., 2009), or obsessive–compulsive disorder (Breiter 
and Rauch, 1996).
represent important steps for further developments of the RVPM. 
As another example, Rushworth and Behrens (2008) proposed that 
whereas OFC computes stimulus–outcome values, ACC computes 
response–outcome values. Here we have ignored this distinction, 
arguing for simplicity that ACC represents both. Consistent with 
this assumption, Amiez et al. (2006) showed that monkey ACC 
cells can encode reward expectations linked to both stimuli and 
actions. Future work should investigate whether incorporating this 
distinction can be fruitful for capturing more subtle distinctions 
between ACC and OFC.
The Actor learns and takes decisions (policies) based on the 
evaluations computed by the Critic. In mammals, it is reasonable to 
identify the DLPFC, basal ganglia (dorsal striatum) and high-level 
motor areas as important structures of the Actor. Indeed, DLPFC, 
striatum, and the premotor cortex receive massive afferents from 
ACC (Devinsky et al., 1995), allowing a tight interaction between 
the two components.
Our paper is not the first to emphasize an important role for 
ACC in RL, and in an Actor-Critic structure in particular. For 
example, the influential paper of (Holroyd and Coles, 2002) pro-
posed just this. Despite the similarities, the current work differs in 
many respects from that model. First, whereas Holroyd and Coles 
identified ACC with (part of) the Actor, we have focused on the 
Critic function instead. Second, consistent with available neuro-
physiology, we made a distinction between positive and negative 
prediction error cells. Further, the current model goes beyond this 
earlier work by explicitly showing that the RL framework is able 
to account not only for explicit reinforcement and error-related 
tasks but also for other cognitive manipulations (e.g., incongruency 
in conflict tasks). In line with our own model, earlier influential 
models such as conflict monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001) 
and error-likelihood theory (Brown and Braver, 2005) have also 
ascribed an evaluative role to ACC. Like error-likelihood theory, 
we propose that ACC is involved with recording the statistics of 
the environment for the purpose of the Actor system. However, 
we go beyond this earlier work by explicitly addressing both the 
single-unit and systems-level data.
predIctIon error beyond the acc
Prediction error signals have been found in several brain areas not 
typically related to reward processing and during tasks that do not 
involve explicit reward administration, for example, the temporo-
occipital junction (TOJ; Summerfield and Koechlin, 2008), the 
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ; Doricchi et al., 2009), the DLPC 
(Glascher et al., 2010), and intraparietal sulcus (IPS; Glascher 
et al., 2010). These findings suggest that prediction error could 
be a general mechanism for learning. Besides dopamine, other 
monoamines (e.g., noradrenaline), may also be involved. Reward 
prediction error, as found in ACC, could be just the dopamine-
based variety of prediction error. It should be noted that learning 
by prediction error would be a neurobiologically refined version of 
the classic feedback-based idea of learning proposed in Cybernetics 
(Wiener, 1948).
In this paper we also tried to model interactions between ACC 
and VTA. We modeled the temporal shifting of VTA neurons from 
reward onset to conditional stimulus onset (TSN neurons). We 
proposed this shift is due to an integration of signals arriving 
Silvetti et al. ACC, value, and prediction error
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 75 | 10
Kerns, J. G., Cohen, J. D., Macdonald, A. 
W. III, Cho, R. Y., Stenger, V. A., and 
Carter, C. S. (2004). Anterior cingulate 
conflict monitoring and adjustments 
in control. Science 303, 1023–1026.
Knutson, B., Taylor, J., Kaufman, M., 
Peterson, R., and Glover, G. (2005). 
Distributed neural representation 
of expected value. J. Neurosci. 25, 
4806–4812.
Leon, M. I., and Shadlen, M. N. (2003). 
Representation of time by neurons 
in the posterior parietal cortex of the 
macaque. Neuron 38, 317–327.
Ljungberg, T., Apicella, P., and Schultz, W. 
(1992). Responses of monkey dopa-
mine neurons during learning of 
behavioral reactions. J. Neurophysiol. 
67, 145–163.
Luu, P., Flaisch, T., and Tucker, D. M. 
(2000). Medial frontal cortex in action 
monitoring. J. Neurosci. 20, 464–469.
Matsumoto, K., Suzuki, W., and Tanaka, 
K. (2003). Neuronal correlates of goal-
based motor selection in the prefrontal 
cortex. Science 301, 229–232.
Matsumoto, M., Matsumoto, K., Abe, 
H., and Tanaka, K. (2007). Medial 
prefrontal cell activity signaling pre-
diction errors of action values. Nat. 
Neurosci. 10, 647–656.
Mauk, M. D., and Buonomano, D. V. 
(2004). The neural basis of temporal 
processing. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 27, 
307–340.
Milham, M. P., Erickson, K. I., Banich, M. 
T., Kramer, A. F., Webb, A., Wszalek, T., 
and Cohen, N. J. (2002). Attentional 
control in the aging brain: insights 
from an fMRI study of the stroop task. 
Brain Cogn. 49, 277–296.
Montague, P. R., Dayan, P., and Sejnowski, 
T. J. (1996). A framework for mesen-
cephalic dopamine systems based 
on predictive Hebbian learning. J. 
Neurosci. 16, 1936–1947.
Nieuwenhuis, S., Schweizer, T. S., Mars, 
R. B., Botvinick, M. M., and Hajcak, 
G. (2007). Error-likelihood predic-
tion in the medial frontal cortex: a 
critical evaluation. Cereb. Cortex 17, 
1570–1581.
Notebaert, W., Houtman, F., Opstal, F. 
V., Gevers, W., Fias, W., and Verguts, 
T. (2009). Post-error slowing: an 
orienting account. Cognition 111, 
275–279.
Nunez Castellar, E., Kuhn, S., Fias, W., and 
Notebaert, W. (2010). Outcome expec-
tancy and not accuracy determines 
posterror slowing: ERP support. Cogn. 
Affect. Behav. Neurosci. 10, 270–278.
tex hypoactivations to an emotionally 
salient task in cocaine addiction. Proc. 
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106, 9453–9458.
Groen, Y., Wijers, A. A., Mulder, L. J., 
Waggeveld, B., Minderaa, R. B., and 
Althaus, M. (2008). Error and feedback 
processing in children with ADHD 
and children with Autistic Spectrum 
Disorder: an EEG event-related poten-
tial study. Clin. Neurophysiol. 119, 
2476–2493.
Harrington, D. L., Haaland, K. Y., and 
Hermanowicz, N. (1998). Temporal 
processing in the basal ganglia. 
Neuropsychology 12, 3–12.
Herrmann, M. J., Mader, K., Schreppel, T., 
Jacob, C., Heine, M., Boreatti-Hummer, 
A., Ehlis, A. C., Scheuerpflug, P., Pauli, 
P., and Fallgatter, A. J. (2010). Neural 
correlates of performance monitoring 
in adult patients with attention deficit 
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). World 
J. Biol. Psychiatry 11, 457–464.
Holroyd, C. B., and Coles, M. G. (2002). 
The neural basis of human error pro-
cessing: reinforcement learning, dopa-
mine, and the error-related negativity. 
Psychol. Rev. 109, 679–709.
Holroyd, C. B., Nieuwenhuis, S., Yeung, 
N., Nystrom, L., Mars, R. B., Coles, 
M. G., and Cohen, J. D. (2004). Dorsal 
anterior cingulate cortex shows fMRI 
response to internal and external error 
signals. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 497–498.
Ivry, R. B. (1996). The representation 
of temporal information in percep-
tion and motor control. Curr. Opin. 
Neurobiol. 6, 851–857.
Jepma, M., and Nieuwenhuis, S. (2011). 
Pupil diameter predicts changes in the 
exploration-exploitation tradeoff: evi-
dence for the adaptive gain theory. J. 
Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 1587–1596.
Jessup, R. K., Busemeyer, J. R., and Brown, 
J. W. (2010). Error effects in anterior 
cingulate cortex reverse when error 
likelihood is high. J. Neurosci. 30, 
3467–3472.
Kable, J. W., and Glimcher, P. W. (2007). 
The neural correlates of subjective 
value during intertemporal choice. 
Nat. Neurosci. 10, 1625–1633.
Kennerley, S. W., Dahmubed, A. F., Lara, 
A. H., and Wallis, J. D. (2009). Neurons 
in the frontal lobe encode the value 
of multiple decision variables. J. Cogn. 
Neurosci. 21, 1162–1178.
Kerns, J. G. (2006). Anterior cingulate and 
prefrontal cortex activity in an FMRI 
study of trial-to-trial adjustments 
on the Simon task. Neuroimage 33, 
399–405.
posterior medial frontal cortex activ-
ity. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 4:231. doi: 
10.3389/fnhum.2010.00231
Cole, M. W., Yeung, N., Freiwald, W. A., 
and Botvinick, M. (2009). Cingulate 
cortex: diverging data from humans 
and monkeys. Trends Neurosci. 32, 
566–574.
Craig, A. D. (2010). The sentient self. Brain 
Struct. Funct. 214, 563–577.
Critchley, H. D., Tang, J., Glaser, D., 
Butterworth, B., and Dolan, R. J. 
(2005). Anterior cingulate activity 
during error and autonomic response. 
Neuroimage 27, 885–895.
Daw, N. D., Kakade, S., and Dayan, 
P. (2002). Opponent interactions 
between serotonin and dopamine. 
Neural Netw. 15, 603–616.
Devinsky, O., Morrell, M. J., and Vogt, B. 
A. (1995). Contributions of anterior 
cingulate cortex to behavior. Brain 
118(Pt 1), 279–306.
Doricchi, F.,] Macci, E., Silvetti, M., and 
Macaluso, E. (2009). Neural correlates of 
the spatial and expectancy components 
of endogenous and stimulus-driven ori-
enting of attention in the posner task. 
Cereb. Cortex. 20, 1574–1585.
Dum, R. P., and Strick, P. L. (2002). Motor 
areas in the frontal lobe of the primate. 
Physiol. Behav. 77, 677–682.
Falkenstein, M., Hohnsbein, J. , 
Hoormann, J., and Blanke, L. (1991). 
Effects of crossmodal divided atten-
tion on late ERP components. II. Error 
processing in choice reaction tasks. 
Electroencephalogr. Clin. Neurophysiol. 
78, 447–455.
Gehring, W. J., Goss, B., Coles, M. G. H., 
Meyer, D. E., and Donchin, E. (1993). 
A neural system for error detection 
and compensation. Psychol. Sci. 4, 
385–390.
Geisler, S., Derst, C., Veh, R. W., and Zahm, 
D. S. (2007). Glutamatergic afferents of 
the ventral tegmental area in the rat. J. 
Neurosci. 27, 5730–5743.
Ghose, G. M., and Maunsell, J. H. (2002). 
Attentional modulation in visual cor-
tex depends on task timing. Nature 
419, 616–620.
Glascher, J., Daw, N., Dayan, P., and 
O’doherty, J. P. (2010). States versus 
rewards: dissociable neural prediction 
error signals underlying model-based 
and model-free reinforcement learn-
ing. Neuron 66, 585–595.
Goldstein, R. Z., Alia-Klein, N., Tomasi, 
D., Carrillo, J. H., Maloney, T., Woicik, 
P. A., Wang, R., Telang, F., and Volkow, 
N. D. (2009). Anterior cingulate cor-
reFerences
Amiez, C., Joseph, J. P., and Procyk, E. 
(2005). Anterior cingulate error-
related activity is modulated by pre-
dicted reward. Eur. J. Neurosci. 21, 
3447–3452.
Amiez, C., Joseph, J. P., and Procyk, E. 
(2006). Reward encoding in the mon-
key anterior cingulate cortex. Cereb. 
Cortex 16, 1040–1055.
Behrens, T. E., Woolrich, M. W., Walton, 
M. E., and Rushworth, M. F. (2007). 
Learning the value of information in 
an uncertain world. Nat. Neurosci. 10, 
1214–1221.
Botvinick, M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D. M., 
Carter, C. S., and Cohen, J. D. (2001). 
Conflict monitoring and cognitive 
control. Psychol. Rev. 108, 624–652.
Botvinick, M., Nystrom, L. E., Fissell, K., 
Carter, C. S., and Cohen, J. D. (1999). 
Conflict monitoring versus selection-
for-action in anterior cingulate cortex. 
Nature 402, 179–181.
Botvinick, M. M. (2007). Conflict moni-
toring and decision making: recon-
ciling two perspectives on anterior 
cingulate function. Cogn. Affect. Behav. 
Neurosci. 7, 356–366.
Breiter, H. C., and Rauch, S. L. (1996). 
Functional MRI and the study of 
OCD: from symptom provocation to 
cognitive-behavioral probes of cor-
tico-striatal systems and the amygdala. 
Neuroimage 4, S127–S138.
Brown, J., Bullock, D., and Grossberg, S. 
(1999). How the basal ganglia use par-
allel excitatory and inhibitory learn-
ing pathways to selectively respond 
to unexpected rewarding cues. J. 
Neurosci. 19, 10502–10511.
Brown, J. W., and Braver, T. S. (2005). 
Learned predictions of error likeli-
hood in the anterior cingulate cortex. 
Science 307, 1118–1121.
Brown, J. W., and Braver, T. S. (2007). Risk 
prediction and aversion by anterior 
cingulate cortex. Cogn. Affect. Behav. 
Neurosci. 7, 266–277.
Bueti, D., Bahrami, B., Walsh, V., and 
Rees, G. (2010). Encoding of tempo-
ral probabilities in the human brain. 
J. Neurosci. 30, 4343–4352.
Bush, G., Luu, P., and Posner, M. I. (2000). 
Cognitive and emotional influences in 
anterior cingulate cortex. Trends Cogn. 
Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 4, 215–222.
Carp, J., Kim, K., Taylor, S. F., Fitzgerald, 
K. D., and Weissman, D. H. (2010). 
Conditional differences in mean reac-
tion time explain effects of response 
congruency, but not accuracy, on 
integrative neuroscience of behavioral control.” Ruth Seurinck is 
a postdoctoral research fellow of the Fund for Scientific Research 
(Flanders Belgium). The authors thank Wim Fias and Wim 
Notebaert for useful comments on this work.
acknowledGments
Massimo Silvetti and Tom Verguts were supported by Ghent 
University GOA grant BOF08/GOA/011. We acknowledge the sup-
port of Ghent University Multidisciplinary Research Platform “The 
Silvetti et al. ACC, value, and prediction error
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 75 | 11
O’Doherty, J. P. (2007). Lights, cam-
embert, action! The role of human 
orbitofrontal cortex in encoding 
stimuli, rewards, and choices. Ann. N. 
Y. Acad. Sci. 1121, 254–272.
Oliveira, F. T., Mcdonald, J. J., and 
Goodman, D. (2007). Performance 
monitoring in the anterior cingulate 
is not all error related: expectancy 
deviation and the representation of 
action-outcome associations. J. Cogn. 
Neurosci. 19, 1994–2004.
O’Reilly, R. C., Frank, M. J., Hazy, T. E., and 
Watz, B. (2007). PVLV: the primary value 
and learned value Pavlovian learning 
algorithm. Behav. Neurosci. 121, 31–49.
Peters, J., and Buchel, C. (2010). Episodic 
future thinking reduces reward delay 
discounting through an enhancement 
of prefrontal-mediotemporal interac-
tions. Neuron 66, 138–148.
Posner, M. I., and Dehaene, S. (1994). 
Attentional networks. Trends Neurosci. 
17, 75–79.
Quilodran, R., Rothe, M., and Procyk, E. 
(2008). Behavioral shifts and action 
valuation in the anterior cingulate 
cortex. Neuron 57, 314–325.
Roger, C., Benar, C. G., Vidal, F., 
Hasbroucq, T., and Burle, B. (2010). 
Rostral Cingulate Zone and correct 
response monitoring: ICA and source 
localization evidences for the unicity 
of correct- and error-negativities. 
Neuroimage 51, 391–403.
Rudebeck, P. H., Walton, M. E., Smyth, A. 
N., Bannerman, D. M., and Rushworth, 
M. F. (2006). Separate neural pathways 
process different decision costs. Nat. 
Neurosci. 9, 1161–1168.
Rushworth, M. F., and Behrens, T. E. 
(2008). Choice, uncertainty and value 
in prefrontal and cingulate cortex. Nat. 
Neurosci. 11, 389–397.
Scheffers, M. K., and Coles, M. G. (2000). 
Performance monitoring in a confus-
ing world: error-related brain activity, 
judgments of response accuracy, and 
types of errors. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. 
Percept. Perform. 26, 141–151.
Schoenbaum, G., Chiba, A. A., and 
Gallagher, M. (1998). Orbitofrontal 
cortex and basolateral amygdala 
encode expected outcomes during 
learning. Nat. Neurosci. 1, 155–159.
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward 
signal of dopamine neurons. J. 
Neurophysiol. 80, 1–27.
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., and Montague, 
P. R. (1997). A neural substrate of 
prediction and reward. Science 275, 
1593–1599.
Stuber, G. D., Klanker, M., De Ridder, B., 
Bowers, M. S., Joosten, R. N., Feenstra, 
M. G., and Bonci, A. (2008). Reward-
predictive cues enhance excitatory 
synaptic strength onto midbrain dopa-
mine neurons. Science 321, 1690–1692.
Summerfield, C., and Koechlin, E. (2008). 
A neural representation of prior infor-
mation during perceptual inference. 
Neuron 59, 336–347.
Sutton, R. S., and Barto, A. G. (1998). 
Reinforcement  Lear ning :  An 
Introduction. Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press.
Tremblay, L., and Schultz, W. (1999). 
Relative reward preference in pri-
mate orbitofrontal cortex. Nature 
398, 704–708.
Tully, K., and Bolshakov, V. Y. (2010). 
Emotional enhancement of memory: 
how norepinephrine enables synaptic 
plasticity. Mol. Brain 3, 15.
Van Veen, V., and Carter, C. S. (2005). 
Separating semantic conflict and 
response conflict in the Stroop task: 
a functional MRI study. Neuroimage 
27, 497–504.
Van Veen, V., Cohen, J. D., Botvinick, 
M. M., Stenger, V. A., and Carter, 
C. S. (2001). Anterior cingulate 
cortex, conflict monitoring, and 
levels of processing. Neuroimage 14, 
1302–1308.
Verguts, T., and Notebaert, W. (2009). 
Adaptation by binding: a learning 
account of cognitive control. Trends 
Cogn. Sci. (Regul. Ed.) 13, 252–257.
Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics or Control 
and Communication in the Animal 
and the Machine. Paris: Hermann & 
Cie Editeurs.
Yu, A. J., and Dayan, P. (2005). Uncertainty, 
neuromodulation, and attention. 
Neuron 46, 681–692.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The 
authors declare that the research was 
conducted in the absence of any com-
mercial or financial relationships that 
could be construed as a potential conflict 
of interest.
Received: 15 April 2011; accepted: 19 
July 2011; published online: 03 August 
2011.
Citation: Silvetti M, Seurinck R and Verguts 
T (2011) Value and prediction error in 
medial frontal cortex: integrating the 
single-unit and systems levels of analysis. 
Front. Hum. Neurosci. 5:75. doi: 10.3389/
fnhum.2011.00075
Copyright © 2011 Silvetti, Seurinck and 
Verguts. This is an open-access arti-
cle subject to a non-exclusive license 
between the authors and Frontiers Media 
SA, which permits use, distribution and 
reproduction in other forums, provided 
the original authors and source are cred-
ited and other Frontiers conditions are 
complied with.
Silvetti et al. ACC, value, and prediction error
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org August 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 75 | 12
that the activity of the biological δ− unit is linked to the outcome 
periods of the error trials, and not to cue periods. In contrast, for 
the δ+ unit, the information about the outcome encoded by the 
timing signal is already provided by the reward signal in itself, so 
the timing signal is not necessary. In order to implement such a 
time-modulated activity we multiplied the V unit output by a tim-








= − + −[ ]  (A4)
where T is a bell-shaped timing signal described by the following:
T t z= − −( )( )exp /τ 2  (A5)
where t is time, τ is the time at which the signal attains its global 
maximum, and z represents its width. Although this timing signal 
was only used for δ− cells, we note that all simulation results were 
very similar if the δ+ cells are also multiplied by the timing signal. In 
all the simulations τ was set as the mean value of the center of the 
reward (c.q., feedback) signal. For example, in part 2 of Simulation 
3 (Scheffers and Coles, 2000) feedback was given after 540 ms for 
incongruent trials and after 500 ms for congruent trials, and the 
feedback signal had a duration of 400 ms for both the trial types, 
so τ was set to 720 ms [(500 + 540 + 400)/2]. Finally, z was set to 
100 for all the simulations. Neurophysiologically, the T signal can 
be considered as a timing signal provided by the cerebellum (Ivry, 
1996; Mauk and Buonomano, 2004), the basal ganglia (Harrington 
et al., 1998), or any other structure providing temporal informa-
tion. Such timing signals have indeed been observed in both human 
and non-human primates (Ghose and Maunsell, 2002; Leon and 
Shadlen, 2003; Bueti et al., 2010).
appendIx
learnInG rule converGence
For simplicity here we rewrite Eq. f1.1 in the case that the V unit 
receives input from only one C unit:
dw
dt
C V= −( )+ −α δ δ     (A1)
Given that δ+ = r − ζ·V, δ− = ζ·V − r and V = Cw, where r is the 
mean reward (product of the reward magnitude (RW) and reward 
probability), the general solution of Eq. A1 is a logistic function:
w
rw C r t
C w C r t C w r
=
( )



















= ζ  (A3)
Therefore, the weight encoding the value of C is proportional to 
r, i.e., to both reward probability and reward magnitude.
tImInG sIGnal
The activity of the δ− unit is given by the difference between the 
expectation (V signal) and the reward (RW signal), as described 
in Eq. f1.4. Therefore, the δ− unit receives excitatory afferents from 
the V unit. Without a timing signal coding the expectation of the 
reward onset time, the δ− unit would start to discharge simultane-
ously with the V unit from cue onset. This is incompatible with 
neurophysiological data (Matsumoto et al., 2007), which shows 
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Figure A1 | interaction between rTs and δ unit activity in the two 
experiments of Simulation 3 (Conflict monitoring). First row (A) illustrative plot 
showing a situation with a large difference in average RTs between congruent and 
incongruent trials (like in Van Veen et al., 2001). The black line illustrates the 
response time of a typical congruent (CO) trial; the red line illustrates the response 
time of a typical incongruent (IC) trial. The blue curve represents the timing signal 
(Eq. A5) which gates (multiplies) the δ− unit activity (Eq. A4). The timing signal 
peaks halfway the most likely feedback interval, that is, where subjects expect 
feedback most likely to occur (cf. Appendix). IN trials typically lead to responses 
after the onset of the timing signal, evoking an anticipated δ− activity (signal 
energy = size of gray area). The frequent activity of the δ− unit reduces in the long 
run the reward expectations linked to IN cues; as a consequence, the subsequent 
reward to a correct IN trial leads to higher δ+ activations. The color intensity of 
yellow bars indicates the activation level (signal amplitude) after IC versus CO 
response. (B) In case of a smaller difference in RTs between CO and IN trials (like 
in Scheffers and Coles, 2000), the signal energy of anticipated δ− responses for IN 
trials is also smaller (size of gray area). As a result, the δ− unit has less opportunity 
to reduce reward expectation, and consequently also the δ+ response during the 
reward period is more similar for CO and IC trials (compare yellow bars after IC 
versus CO response). Second row Simulation 3, stimulus-locked activity of both 
the delta units (δ− + δ+), for CO and IN correct trials. The process qualitatively 
illustrated in the first row is here shown corresponding to the Simulation 3 design 
specifications and results. The gray area shows the additional δ− signal in IN versus 
CO trials; note that it is wider in (C) than in (D). Potentially, the δ− activity could also 
account for the N2 wave (Yeung et al., 2004), if we include a mechanism for 
“partial error detection,” which has been proposed to be its origin (Burle et al., 
2008). This remains to be developed, however. The dark yellow area is the 
additional δ+ signal during feedback for IN versus CO trials; note that it is bigger in 
(C) than in (D). Third row Stimulus-locked whole ACC activity (i.e., V + δ− + δ+) in 
Simulation 3. As shown in the first row, due to the discounting effect of δ− activity, 
IN trials evoked a lower reward expectation than CO trials, in both (e) [t(19) = 6.55, 
p < 0.0001] and (F) [t(19) = 7.54, p < 0.0001], while the pa ttern of activation 
reverses during the feedback period, showing a significant effect only in [(e) see 
also Figure 3 response-l ocked analysis in the main text]. Statistical analysis was 
conducted on the time bin 0–600 ms stimulus-locked, following the procedures 
described in the Section “Methods” of “Simulation 3.” Timescale in milliseconds.
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Figure A2 | Stimulus-locked activity of whole ACC module in correct 
trials of Simulation 4 (error Likelihood). During the cue period (gray area) 
the ACC module of the RVPM codes for reward expectations. Hence, the 
system responds more strongly to Low Error-Likelihood trials (more 
rewarding) than to High Error-Likelihood trials [less rewarding; F(1,77) = 56.26, 
p < 0.0001]. For the same reasons described in Figure A1, the system 
showed also higher responses for Go trials (fast RTs) than to Change trials 
[slow RTs; F(1,77) = 14,17, p < 0.001]. In addition, the effect in the model was 
also partly due to differences in reward rates between Go and Change trials 
(consistent with the data of Brown and Braver, 2005). It must be noted that 
the fMRI data of Brown and Braver (2005) could reflect only the post-
response epoch, because the cue period in the empirical paradigm was short 
and hence is not picked up by a slow hemodynamic measurement like fMRI. 
Statistical analysis was conducted on the time bin 0–600 ms stimulus-locked 
(gray area), following the procedures described in the Section “Methods” of 
“Simulation 4.” Timescale in milliseconds.
Figure A3 | Time course of TSN signal during unrewarded trials in early, 
mid, and late stages of training (supplement to Figure 1C, right panel). 
The inhibition of dopaminergic activity increases as a function of trial number 
(compare dips in Early, Mid, Late curves). The vertical line indicates the 
expected time of reward release (missed, in this case). Timescale in 
milliseconds.
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